Épisodes

  • Katie Crombe and John A. Nagl – “A Call to Action: Lessons from Ukraine for the Future Force”
    Sep 22 2023
    A Call to Action: Lessons from Ukraine for the Future Force Fifty years ago, the US Army faced a strategic inflection point after a failed counterinsurgency effort in Vietnam. In response to lessons learned from the Yom Kippur War, the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command was created to reorient thinking and doctrine around the conventional Soviet threat. Today’s Army must embrace the Russo-Ukrainian conflict as an opportunity to reorient the force into one as forward-thinking and formidable as the Army that won Operation Desert Storm. This episode suggests changes the Army should make to enable success in multidomain large-scale combat operations at today’s strategic inflection point. Read the article here. Read the episode transcript here.   Email usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Keywords: strategic inflection point, Ukraine, multidomain operations (MDO), mission command, large-scale combat operations (LSCO)
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    17 min
  • Brian McAllister Linn – “A Historical Perspective on Today’s Recruiting Crisis”
    Sep 15 2023
    This podcast analyzes the US Army’s successive recruiting crises, identifying their consistent patterns and the efforts to resolve them, and makes three provocative arguments. First, there is a long-standing institutional tension between recruiting personnel for the combat arms and technical and administrative specialists. Second, many of today’s talent management problems were first identified in a 1907 General Staff report and reiterated in subsequent studies. Third, the Army has pursued innovative recruitment strategies, but much of their success depended on factors outside the service’s control. The podcast concludes with four history-based recruiting lessons and an affirmation that the 2019 Army People Strategy recognizes the need for the Army to revise its talent management approach. Read the article here. Email usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Keywords: recruitment, US Army history, personnel policy, talent management, Army People Strategy
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    10 min
  • Conrad C. Crane – Parameters Autumn 2023 Issue Preview
    Sep 6 2023
    Parameters Autumn 2023 Issue Preview This podcast offers a preview of the latest Parameters demi-issue and full issue. Read the issue here. Read the podcast transcript here. Email usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Keywords: recruiting, Ukraine, Taiwan, Antarctica, Russia, Chechen Kadyrovtsy
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    10 min
  • John A. Bonin and James D. Scudieri – “Change and Innovation in the Institutional Army from 1860–2020”
    Aug 28 2023
    John A. Bonin and James D. Scudieri – "Change and Innovation in the Institutional Army" This episode showcases the understudied institutional Army, the generating force, as a critical prerequisite for overall strategic success. Competition, crisis, and conflict require more than the manned, trained, and equipped units that deploy. This podcast analyzes six case studies of institutional Army reforms over 160 years to examine adaptation in peace and war. The conclusions provide historical insights to inform current practices and fulfill the Army’s articulated 2022 Institutional Strategy. Read the article here. E-mail usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Keywords: institutional Army, generating force, Department of the Army staff, Army Futures Command, adaptation, innovation About the authors: Dr. John A. Bonin is a consultant and Distinguished Fellow at the US Army War College. He held a variety of field and academic positions during 30 years of active-duty military service before retiring in June 2002. Bonin has degrees from the United States Military Academy, Duke University, and Temple University. As a member of the faculty for over 27 years, he has served as an instructor, historian, and battlefield guide. Bonin has published, presented, and advised widely. Dr. James D. Scudieri is the senior research historian at the Strategic  Studies Institute, US Army War College. He held a variety of field and academic positions during 30 years of active-duty military service before retiring in August 2013. Scudieri has a master of arts degree from Hunter College of CUNY, a master of military art and science degree from the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), and a doctorate in military history from the Graduate School and University Center of CUNY. He is a 2004 graduate of the US Army War College and the Advanced Strategic Arts Program
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    11 min
  • Spencer L. French – “Innovation, Flexibility, and Adaptation: Keys to Patton’s Information Dominance”
    Aug 8 2023
    "Innovation, Flexibility, and Adaptation: Keys to Patton's Information Dominance" In 1944, Third US Army created a cohesive and flexible system for managing information and denying it to the enemy that aligned operational concepts with technological capabilities. The organization’s success in the European Theater highlights its effective combined arms integration. An examination of the historical record shows the creative design of the Signal Intelligence and Army Information Services enabled Third Army to deliver information effects consistently and provides a useful model for considering the dynamics at play in fielding new and experimental multidomain effects formations. Read the article here. Read the podcast transcript here. E-mail usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Keywords: World War II, Third United States Army, military effectiveness, force design, information advantage About the author: Major Spencer L. French, US Army, is a military intelligence officer currently assigned as the operations officer for the 704th Military Intelligence Brigade at Fort Meade, Maryland. His research interests focus on historical military innovation and force design.
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    16 min
  • Luke P. Bellocchi – “The Strategic Importance of Taiwan to the United States and Its Allies”
    Jul 31 2023
    Luke P. Bellocchi – "The Strategic Importance of Taiwan to the United States and Its Allies" This podcast presents four factors to consider in evaluating Taiwan’s strategic importance to the United States and its allies and answers a question often raised at forums concerning the Indo-Pacific: “Why should the United States care” about this small island in the Pacific? The response often given is simply US credibility, and while this is an important factor, this podcast reviews a wider array of possible factors to consider when answering that question. The study of these factors should assist US military and policy practitioners in accurately evaluating the related strategic environment. Through a survey of official US policy statements and strategy documents across administrations, part two of this podcast (to be featured in a future issue) will examine the evolving US perception of Taiwan throughout the aggressive strengthening of China and during Taiwan’s domestic political development into a full-fledged democracy. Read the article here. E-mail usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Keywords: Taiwan, geopolitical, credibility, democracy, authoritarian Read the transcript: Luke P. Bellocchi – "The Strategic Importance of Taiwan to the United States and Its Allies" About the author: Luke P. Bellocchi, JD, LLM, MSSI, MBA, served in senior and senior executive positions throughout his government career and is now an associate professor of practice at National Defense University, where he teaches strategy and a China elective at the Joint Advanced Warfighting School. His recent work, “The U.S. One China Policy: A Primer for Professional Military Education,” can be found at https://jfsc.ndu.edu/Media/Campaigning-Journals/.  
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    10 min
  • Allison Abbe – “Understanding the Adversary: Strategic Empathy and Perspective Taking in National Security”
    Jul 5 2023
    National security practitioners need to understand the motives, mindsets, and intentions of adversaries to anticipate and respond to their actions effectively. Although some authors have argued empathy helps build an understanding of the adversary, research points to its cognitive component of perspective taking as the more appropriate skill for national security practitioners to have. In this podcast, Dr. Allison  Abbe synthesizes previous research on the development and application of perspective taking in analysis and decision making and recommends four ways strategists and practitioners can enhance their ability to gain insight into adversaries. Read the article here. E-mail usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Keywords: perspective taking, strategic empathy, political psychology, military education, cognitive bias Episode Transcript: Understanding the Adversary: Strategic Empathy and Perspective Taking in National Security Stephanie Crider (Host)  You're listening to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production focused on national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.   I'm talking with Dr. Allison Abbe today, author of “Understanding the Adversary: Strategic Empathy and Perspective Taking in National Security,” which was published in the Summer 2023 issue of Parameters. Abbe is a professor of organizational studies at the US Army War College. Her research focuses on the development of leadership and intercultural skills in national security personnel.  Welcome to Decisive Point, Dr. Abbe.  Dr. Allison Abbe  Thanks for having me.  Host  Your article synthesizes research on perspective taking in analysis and decision making and recommends four ways strategists and practitioners can enhance their ability to gain insight into adversaries. Will you please explain perspective taking in the context of strategic empathy?  Abbe  Sure. So, strategic empathy has been talked about in terms of understanding adversaries and competitors and being able to better anticipate their actions. And in psychology, the topic of empathy has been more in the context of helping relationships between clinicians and patients, or clinicians and clients in the context of mental health. And so, there's a rich literature on empathy but in a slightly different context than in the national security arena.   In psychology, empathy is talked about in terms of empathic concern for the other person or party, motivation to engage in empathy, and then perspective taking. So those three components are not as equally applicable in the national security arena as they might be in a one-on-one relationship—an interpersonal relationship like in a romantic relationship or a patient-practitioner medical kind of context. So, focusing on perspective taking allows us to pull just the really relevant skills about empathy that can be applied in the national security context and focus more on how it is people can go about understanding the cognitive perspective of someone else without taking on the emotions of another party or really wanting to help the other party. You can maintain your own interests while understanding the perspective of the adversary, or even a partner.  Host  How can leaders and strategists develop perspective taking as a skill?  Abbe  So, perspective taking as a basic ability develops in childhood. We know from the developmental psychology literature that we're capable of it as small children. But it's a very cognitively demanding skill, and so people don't automatically engage in it. Your default is to use your own perspective, and then you only take on someone else's perspective with additional cognitive effort. And so,
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    8 min
  • Nicholas A. A. Murray – “Geniuses Dare to Ride Their Luck: Clausewitz’s Card Game Analogies”
    Jun 30 2023
    Nicholas A. A. Murray – “Geniuses Dare to Ride Their Luck: Clausewitz's Card Game Analogies” Scholars have been using the wrong card games to analyze Carl von Clausewitz’s analogies in On War, which has led to errors in understanding his ideas. This podcast identifies the games Clausewitz discusses, allowing for a more accurate interpretation of his original meaning for the study of war. Since Clausewitz’s ideas underpin strategy development within service education systems, it is critical his ideas are fully understood in context. Read the article here. E-mail usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Keywords: card games, luck/chance, genius, gambling, daring, probability, trinity, cheating Episode Transcript: Geniuses Dare to Ride Their Luck: Clausewitz's Card Game Analogies Stephanie Crider (Host)  You're listening to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production focused on national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.   I'm talking today with Dr. Nicholas Murray. Murray designs and runs war games for the Secretary of Defense Strategic Thinkers Program at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and Professional Military Education. He also translates the works of Carl von Clausewitz and other theorists. He's the author of “Geniuses Dare to Ride Their Luck: Clausewitz’s Card Game Analogies,” which was published in the Summer 2023 issue of Parameters.   Welcome to Decisive Point, Nick.  Nicholas A. A. Murray  Thank you very much for having me. It's a pleasure.  Host  Your article asserts that scholars have been using the wrong card games to analyze Clausewitz’s analogies on war, which has led to errors in understanding his ideas. Please expand on that.  Murray  The reason I got into this . . .  I think a bit of background might help . . .  is the card games we use, which are typically blackjack, poker, or games like chess and bridge and things, didn't seem to line up with what else I was reading and finding in his histories in terms of how he understood luck. And so, as I dug into it, the question struck me, which was what games would he have actually been familiar with, and what would he have played?   And except for chess, the other games weren't popular or even invented at the time of his life or writing. So, I started to look into that. What I found was that the games that he had in mind and actually discussed often—sometimes explicitly—were different stochastically in terms of luck. And they were different in terms of player interaction. And they were different in terms of things like cheating, which was an inherent part of almost all the games with which he was familiar. Taking that into account, it meant that contemporary analogies, using, say, blackjack, where one can card count, you can change the strategy of playing against the casino in your favor, for example. That simply didn't exist. And so, he wasn't thinking about something like that. He was thinking about something far more chance ridden than we have in mind.  Host  Which card games was Clausewitz likely talking about?  Murray  The three I've been able to identify, along with something called würfel, which is a version of a variety of different dice games, which is simply you roll a dice and bet on it. Sort of like craps, I suppose.   But the three main ones are games called faro, skat, and ombre. And these were games that were familiar to Clausewitz. He explicitly references two and implicitly references skat via phrases that occur within that game.   These card games are much different from the ones we would think about in terms of blackjack or poker.
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    15 min